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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
DARRELL EUGENE HEATH,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
12610

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with grand larceny on
April 12, 1971, as a result of the theft of one 1965 Comet
automobile. He was subsequently bound over to the
Fourth Judicial District Court to stand trial.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of grand larceny by a
jury on May 27, 1971, and sentenced to an indeterminate
term of from one to ten years.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the decision of the district
court should be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of April 11, 1971, and the morning
of April 12, 1971, a 1965 Comet automobile, owned by
Lillian Hales and Larry Hales, was parked in front of
their residence at 57 North 6th East in Spanish Fork,
Utah (Tr. 19, 28). Between 5: 00 a.m. and 5: 30 a.m. on
April 12, 1971, Lillian Hales and her husband, Duane
Hales, heard the motor, to what they said was their 1965
Comet, start (Tr. 12, 22). Lillian and Duane Hales looked
out their window and saw what they believed to be their
1965 Comet driving away from their home (Tr. 12, 22).
Larry Hales at about 5: 30 a.m. was awakened by his
father and he promptly called the Spanish Fork Police
and the Utah Highway Patrol and reported his car as
missing (Tr. 26, 27).
At about 5: 40 a.m., Officer Bradford, of the Utah
Highway Patrol attempted to pull over a 1965 Comet
driven by the defendant but a high speed chase resulted
(Tr. 32, 33, 34, 35). The defendant was subsequently
apprehended and taken to jail by a Provo City Police
Officer (Tr. 35). Officer Bradford never informed the defendant of his legal rights as he did not personally place
the defendant under arrest (Tr. 41). The defendant was
taken to jail by the Provo City Police (Tr. 35).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN
RE FUS ING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S

1

g

3

FIRST MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S CASE OR IN
RE FUS ING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S
SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL.
A. THE STATE DID NOT FAIL TO PROVE,
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT DEFENDANT TOOK THE 1965 COMET.
Defendant's analysis supporting his contention that
the State failed, as a matter of law, to prove that defendant took the 1965 Comet is based on three propositions.
First, that mere possession of recently stolen goods is
insufficient evidence upon which to base a conviction of
larceny. Defendant cites People v. Swazey, 6 Utah 93,
21 P. 2d 400 (1889), as supporting this contention. Second, that the State failed to show an unsatisfactory explanation for defendant's possession of recently stolen
goods. Third, that the State must present rebuttal evidence to defendant'.s explanation of his possession of the
stolen goods.
Defendant correctly states that mere possession of
stolen goods is insufficient evidence upon which to base
a conviction of larceny, People v. Swazey, supra. The
Court in Swazey did state, however:
"If the property had been found in the defendant's possession immediately after loss, such
possession might have been a circumstance to be
taken into consideration by a jury, with other
circumstances, in arriving at a conclusion as to
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the guilt or innocence of the defendant." Id. at
402.
In the Swazey case, the "... element of recent possession ,
with or without accompanying circumstances, did not
exist, and no guilty knowledge could be inferred from the '
possession." Id. at 402. In the case at bar, the defendant
did possess stolen goods immediately after loss. According to Swazey, that circumstance along with other cir·
cumstances are to be considered by the jury and a determination of guilt or innocence is to be made. In the
instant case the jury considered the circumstance of pos·
session of the recently stolen car along with other circumstances such as the fact that defendant tried to avoid
apprehension by Officer Bradford in a high speed chase
through Provo City, when Officer Bradford attempted
to stop the defendant (Tr. 33, 34). In considering all of
these circumstances the jury concluded that the defendant was guilty of larceny. There was not simply the
circumstance of the defendant possessing recently stolen
goods but much more. For instance, the defendant had
possession of the car almost immediately after Lillian
and Duane Hales heard its engine start and saw the car
being driven away from the front of their home (Tr. 12,
22). Also, there is the fact that the defendant desperately
tried to avoid apprehension by Officer Bradford (Tr. 33,
34).
I

1

Appellant further contends that the State failed to
show an unsatisfactory explanation on the part of defendant as to the reasons for his possession of the 1965
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Comet, Utah Code Annotated § 76-38-1 (1953) states:

at

n,
,'

"Possession of property recently stolen, when
the person in possession fails to make a satisfactory explanation, shall be deemed prima facie evidence of guilt."
Appellant cites State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119 P. 1023
(1911) as supporting his proposition that the State is
required to prove the facts of the larceny, recent possession in the defendant, and that he failed to satisfactorily
explain his possession. It is only fair to go beyond defendant's discussion of the Potello case and fully analyze its
meaning and significance. The Court does state that a
prima facie case cannot arise unless the state proves the
three elements stated above. But, the Court goes on to
say the following:
"We are not holding that a presumption or
an inference may not arise against the accused on
the mere proof of the larceny and his possession
of the recently stolen property. We are holding
that under the express wording of the statute the
mere proof of such facts alone is not sufficient to
make a prima facie case of guilt, and that to make
such a case the state, in the absence of other evidence, must also prove that the accused failed to
satisfactorily account for or explain his possession."
Id. at 1027. (Emphasis added.)
Appellant argues that the State must prove the three
elements in order to get to the jury but this is correct
only in the absence of other evidence according to Potello.
In the case at bar there is other convincing evidence of
defendant's guilt which the jury correctly considered in
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arriving at its verdict. Further, appellant's attempt to
avoid apprehension can indirectly serve as an explanation, or lack of it, of his possession of the stolen automobile.
Defendant in the case at bar voluntarily explained
his possession of the 19G5 Comet as part of the presentation of his case. The defendant's feeling that his explanation cannot be used by the state in proving larceny is
not as expressly condemned by the Potello case as it
seems. The Court in Potello further explained as follows:
"We now look to the defendant's evidence, of
course, he cannot complain of insufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the verdict, though the State
failed to make a case, if he himself proved one for
it. Does, therefore, the evidence on the part of
the State, together with that of the defendant,
prove the larceny and that the defendant committed it." Id. at 1029.

In the instant case all of the evidence taken in sum
and as viewed by the jury proves the larceny beyond a
reasonable doubt and that the defendant committed it.
The judge correctly allowed the case, considering all the
evidence, to go to the jury for a determination. In State
v. Peterson, 110 Utah 43, 174 P. 2d 843 (1946), the Court
in a larceny case stated a general proposition:
"A prima facie case is one based upon evidence sufficient to raise a question for determination by the jury. As is often put, if the evidence
favorable to the State, with all reasonable inferences and intendments that can be drawn therefrom, could sustain a verdict of guilty the cause

D
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should be submitted to the jury." Id. at 845.
The trial judge in this case determined from the evidence
that the case was sufficient to submit to the jury and
sustain a verdict of guilty. The sufficiency of this evidence is clear from the record and has been stated herein.
The dicta in State v. Potello, supra, that if the State
fails to make a case, the defendant has no complaint if
he proves part of the State's case for it has received further support by the Utah Court. In State v. Stockton,
6 Utah 2d 212, 310 P. 2d 398 (1957), the Court
confronted this problem in a case arising out of a conviction for attempt to commit burglary. The defense in
Stockton presented its evidence after it moved for a directed verdict after the State rested. The Court advanced
the following principle:
"We are of the opinion that defendant, having
elected to put on his defense, made all testimony
offered available for the jury's consideration." Id.
at 400.
The Court in Stockton cites two authorities for this principle. The first is State v. Denison, 352 Mo. 572, 178 S.
W. 2d 4.49 (1944). In this case the Missouri court basically stated that if the defense chooses to present evidence
rather than stand, the trial court is bound to take the
defendant's evidence into consideration insofar as it
helped the state's case. See State v. Denison, supra, at
452. Secondly, the Court in Stockton relied on the dicta
in Patella, and the opinion specifically cites this case as
follows:
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"This court in a dicta statement in State v.
Potello, 40 l!tah 56, at page 70, 119 P. 1023, at
Page 1029, said:
'. . . of course, he cannot complain of the
insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
verdict, though the State failed to make a
case, if he himself proves one for it.' " Id. at
1029.
The Court in Stockton has essentially followed the
dicta in Potello and held that once the defendant elects
to put on his case, all of the testimony offered is available
for the jury's consideration.
Defendant also contends that the State had the burden of presenting rebuttal evidence to defendant's explanation of his possession of the 1965 Comet, and if the
State could not do so the case must be withheld from the
jury. Respondent does not believe the law of Utah requires rebuttal evidence to defendant's explanation. In
confronting the problem of whether a situation similar
to the one at bar could be given to the jury the court in
State v. Hitesrrwn, 58 Utah 262, 198 P. 769 (1921) stated:
" ... when, as here, a defendant has it entirely
within his own power to make certain statements
or explanations concerning his possession of recently stolen property, and the state is powerless
to meet the statements categorically, no one who
would be willing to disregard the truth could
be convicted of the theft where there were
no eyewitnesses to the taking. . . . The jury, in
considering all the facts and circumstances in evidency may refuse to give credence to defendant's
statements or explanations, or to those of his witnesses, if such statements or explanations, in view
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of all the facts and circumstances, seem unreasonable or not well founded in fact. Where, as here,
property recently stolen is found in the possession
of the accused, it is for the jury to say whether
his explanations and statements respecting that
possession are satisfactory or otherwise." Id. at
770.
This is what occurred in the instant case. The state
presented its evidence and the defendant explained his
possession of the recently stolen goods. The State was
powerless to categorically meet and contradict the defendant's explanation, so, as the Hitesman case points
out, it was for the jury to accept or reject the defendant's
explanation in view of the facts and circumstances presented by the state. This the jury rightfully did and a
verdict of guilty was rendered. State v. Shonka, 3 Utah
2d 124, 279 A. 2d 711 (1955), also supports the view that
a jury can reject an uncontradicted explanation made by
a witness. Shonka concerned an appeal from a larceny
conviction and the court stated therein:
"Self interest or improbability can always be
used to discredit or discount the value of the testimony of a witness and substantive direct evidence, though uncontradicted may be disbelieved
by a jury when the witness is a party or otherwise interested." Id. at 714. (Emphasis supplied.)
In case at bar the Court correctly submitted the
question to the jury and the jury could and did refuse
to accept defendant's explanation, even though categorically uncontradicted. Moreover, all of the facts and circumstances present in this case, including defendant's ex-
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planation, \Vere sufficient for the jury to return a verdict
of guilty. Also, it is contended that the defendant's futile
attempt to avoid apprehension is at least indirect rebuttal
to the defendant's explanation.

B. THE STATE DID PROVE THAT DEFENDANT TOOK THE AUTOMOBILE
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
OWNER.
Defendant argues that the state failed to show that
both owners of the 1965 Comet, Lillian Hales and Larry
Hales, did not consent to the taking of the automobile.
Specifically, defendant contends that lack of consent was
not shown for Larry Hales and also that the record is
devoid of any evidence upon which a jury could find that
there was lack of consent on the part of Larry Hales. A
review of the record shows that appellant's contention
is not supported in fact. Moreover, there are statements
in the transcript made by Larry Hales that provide more
than sufficient evidence for a jury to make a rational
finding. For instance, the following testimony occurred
in the trial during direct examination of Larry Hales:
THE WITNESS: Okay. I looked out the window
and my car was missing. So I called the Highway
Patrol and I called the Spanish Fork Police.
Q. (By Mr. Gammon) And what did you say?
A. I told them that my car was missing (Tr.
27).
Is this the testimony of someone who may have consented to the taking of his automobile? Would someone
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call the police and report that his car was missing if he
had consented to its use? This testimony provides sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find lack of
consent on the part of Larry Hales. It is difficult to
imagine the jury arriving at a different conclusion.
With the State showing the lack of consent on the
part of Lillian Hales (Tr. 14, 15) and Larry Hales (Tr.
27) they sufficiently proved this necessary element of
larceny.
In State v. Reese, 44 Utah 256, 140 P. 126 (1914),
the ccurt was confronted with a similar issue in a larceny
action. The defendant in the Reese case argued that
necessary want of consent from the railroad company,
from which he was convicted of stealing certain cargo,
was not sufficiently shown. The court analyzed the problem in this manner:
"Moreover, where property is taken secretly
and without the owner's knowledge, the proof of
nonconsent may be inferred from other facts, since
it cannot be assumed under such circumstances
that the owner consented." Id. at 128.
Although the owner in the Reese case was a corporation,
the same reasoning applies to the case at bar. As in the
Reese case the nonconsent can easily be inferred from
' other facts -and it cannot be assumed that the owner consented. This is clearly shown, as stated earlier, by the
tansctipt of proceedings at the trial court.
C. THE STATE PROVED AND THE JURY
CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
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DEFENDANT TOOK THE AUTOMOBILE WITH INTENT TO STEAL.
Defendant argues a number of points on this basis
for reversal. First, that defendant's intent to steal was
shown only circumstantially. Second, that this determin.
ation is one for the court and not the jury. Third, that
defendant's actions in trying to avoid apprehension was
equally consistent with innocence as guilt due to the alleged existence of "flashback" arising from defendant's
drug problem.
Defendant cites State v. Dubois, 64 Utah 433, 231
P. 625 (1924) as supporting his position. In Dubois the
State proved intent to steal by circumstantial evidence,
which defendant contends is not proper. The circum·
stances in the Dubois case, which arose from the theft
of livestock, were that the animal was taken by a route
which avoided observation, transporting the calf in an
automobile, and apparent effort to avoid meeting one of
the animal's owners. The court held that these circumstances, among others, justified the jury in finding felonious intent. The circumstances in the Dubois case are not
any more convincing than the circumstances in the case
at bar where defendant desperately tried to avoid apprehension by the police officer. Respondent feels that they
are not more convincing.
Defendant's contention that the determination of
taking with felonious intent is for the court and not the
jury is equally weak. Again, the case of State v. Dubois,
supra, provides a convincing answer. After the quotation

!
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from Dubois on page 27 of defendant's brief the court
continued:
"As a general rule, the question of whether
or not the taking is felonious, is a question of fact
to be decided by the jury . . . If the evidence is
such that all reasonable minds should arrive at
the same conclusion that the tal<lng was without
felonious intent, then the question becomes one of
law, and the verdict of guilty should be set aside.
But if, after a consideration of all the evidence,
reasonable minds may differ and arrive at opposite
conclusions, the findings of the jury must control."
Id. at 626, 627.
In reviewing all the evidence in the case at bar it is possible that reasonable minds could arrive at different conclusions and therefore, according to Dubois, the findings
of the jury must control and that finding is one of intent
to steal.
Defendant argues further that his explanation of
his atte!:1pt to avoid apprehension by the police is equally
consistent with innocence as with guilt. He bases this
on the alleged existence of drug "flashback" due to his
drug use problem and that when he was pulled over by
the officer he suffered a "flashback" which caused his
reaction, i.e., the high speed chase. Respondent agrees
with appellant that in Dr. Washburn's letter to Judge
Sorenson of April 14, 1971 (R. 8), it was stated that the
defendant has a serious drug problem. But, this letter
does not make defendant's explanation of his actions as
perfectly plausible as defendant suggests. There was no
mention in Dr. Washburn's letter of the existence of a
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drug "flashback" problem with the defendant. Seemingly
if this phenomenon existed with defendant and it was in
fact a serious problem it would have been mentioned by
Dr. Washburn. The only mention of the existence of
"flashback" was by the defendant. This explanation the
jury determined not to give credence, but accepted the
state's evidence in its stead.
POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTED
BY EFFECTIVE COUNSEL WHICH MET
THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
There is certainly no question that the criminal defendant has the constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel and that the counsel provide reasonably effective
assistance as opposed to errorless assistance. See Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d
799 (1963); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F. 2d 592 (5th Cir.
1960), modified 289 F. 2d 928.
The defendant contends that the totality of events
and the representation as a whole indicates the defendant
was inadequately and ineffectively represented. Respondent feels that a review of the entire record and specifically the transcript reveals effective action and a vigorous
defense on the part of the defendant's attorney. This
claim by defendant should be carefully looked at before
a determination of the adequacy of counsel is made. The

U1

J

15

tgly

in
by
of

he
be

Utah Supreme Court has stated that:
" . . . this claim, now the last refuge of the
guilty, that 'my lawyer was incompetent' should
be carefully looked at." Jaramillo v. Turner, 24
Utah 2d 19, 465 P. 2d 343 at 344 (1970).
A review· of the record in the case at bar does not show
lack of r2al concern by the defendant's attorney but
rather a genuine and active defense.

In State v. Farnsworth, 13 Utah 2d 103, 368 P. 2d
914 (1962), the court would not lend credence to the
defendant's argument that he was denied a fair trial because of the incompetency of counsel. This was because
everything done by the attorney could rationally find
explan:ition in a legitimate exercise of strategy. See 269
P. 2d 914 at 915. In the Farnsworth case the defendant's
lawyer waived the preliminary hearing, waived a jury,
made no opening statement, failed to make objections to
introduction of evidence, and only cross-examined one of
the State's witnesses. The court stated that upon reviewing the record it could not be shown that the defendant
w2s not fairly and competently represented. In the case
at bar, where the defendant's counsel more than adequately performed the procedures not performed in the
Farnsworth case, there is not a single action or inaction
by counsel which could not be demonstrated as being an
exercise of strategy. This is clearly demonstrated by the
record.
A review of the transcript shows a vigorous defense
on the part of the defendant's counsel. To cite just a few
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examples from the transcript it can be seen that the de- \
fendant's attorney objected to and defended his objection .
to the admission of evidence (Tr. 42, 43), that counsel
vigorously objected to the State's motion to amend the
information (Tr. 46, 47, 48), that both witnesses for the
defendant stated that they had discussed that case with
the defendant's attorney prior to their testimony in court
(Tr. 61, 66). These examples are just a few of many examples showing that the defendant had strong representation.
The Utah Supreme Court has set up certain standards to determine whether counsel for a defendant in
a criminal action has adequately represented his client.
In Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P. 2d 241 (1969),
a habeas corpus action, the court stated that the constitutional right to counsel is ". . . not satisfied by a sham
or pretense of an appearance in the record by an attorney
who manifests no real concern about the interests of the
accused." Id. at 243.
The defendant alleges that his attorney made only
short visits with him before the trial and was afforded
only a short discussion with his attorney prior to the
preliminary hearing. This allegation is not raised by the
record on appeal and is therefore not properly before this
Court. Suffice it to say, however, that a short conference
does not mean the lawyer is not preparing or making a
good defense. This court in Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah
2d 294, 452 P. 2d 323 (1969), in considering a similar
issue, stated:
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" ... no deficiency in that regard follows solely
from the fact that the conferences were relatively
brief. A conference is not inherently wrong simply
because it does not take a long time." Id. at 324
and 325.
The defendant, on appeal, specifically cites as an
example of his counsel's alleged unconstitutionally inadequate representation the alleged failure of counsel to investigate and assert a particular defense. This defense
is the alleged existence of a drug "flashback" with the
defendant. Defendant's brief asserts that the attorney
failed to investigate and assert this defense at trial. A
review of the record shows that this alleged "flashback"
phenomenon was presented by the defense for the jury's
consideration. In direct examination of the defendant
by defendant's counsel this "flashback" phenomenon was
presented. The following dialogue took place.
"Q. Now, would you tell us what happened when
the officer - did you ever see a signal from the
officer?
A. Well, no, not really. I just kind of blacked
out.
Q. Was there any reason for this?
A. Well, they call it a flashback ....
Q. What is this 'flashback' that you speak of?

A. It's a flash drugs. You don't know what is
happening. You just kind of flashout. . . ." (Tr,

70).

It can be seen from this dialogue that the defendant's
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counsel helped, through his questioning, to have the
"flashback" phenomenon presented to the jury. The fact
that the jury chose not to accept this explanation does
not mean that his counsel did an inadequate job.
The defendant's drug problem was mentioned in the '
record but once aside from the transcript. This is in a 1
letter from Dr. Washburn, at the Community Mental
Health Center, to Judge Sorensen (R. 8). In this letter
Dr. Washburn discussed the defendant's drug problem.
In his discussion Dr. Washburn never mentioned the de·
fendant's alleged drug "flashback" problem. It seems that
if the defendant had such a problem it would have been ·
mentioned by Dr. Washburn.
It can clearly be seen by reviewing the record that
the defendant was enthusiastically represented by CQUfi•
sel and that the defense presented the defendant's alleged
"flashback" explanation to the jury.

As was stated in the Farnsworth case:
"The privilege of an accused to the assistance
of counsel is a fundamental right which means a
right to a reputable member of the bar who is willing and in a position to honestly and conscientiously represent his interests." 368 P. 2d 914 at
915.
This is what the defendant had in the instant case;
a reputable member of the bar who honestly and conscientiously represented his interests. The record compels this conclusion and thus the conclusion that the
defendant had constitutionally adequate counsel.
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Respondent does not address itself any further to
the allegations of incompetency of counsel raised by the
affidavit of Appellant. It is well settled that on appeal
the Supreme Court may only consider items properly
before it as part of the record on appeal. People v. Callaghan, 4 Utah 49, 63, 6 P. 49 (1885); Atkinson v. Pellegrino, 110 Utah 363, 173 P. 2d 543 (1946); Adamson v.
Brochbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 264 (1947). The mere
physical presence of a document in the file is irrelevant
if it is not properly part of the record on appeal. Adamson v. Brockbank, supra.
The present record on appeal was certified and transmitted to the Supreme Court by the County Clerk on
August 4, 1971. Appellant's affidavit is not part of that
record. The affidavit was prepared on September 22, 1971
and filed with the Supreme Court on September 23, 1971
with no indication that any proper procedures were complied with to make it part of the record. Clearly any
allegations made in the affidavit may not be considered
on this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent contends that the sum of evidence
presented to the jury in this action was sufficient for a
verdict of guilty to be rendered. The State proved that
the automobile was taken without consent of the owners
and the defendant failed to satisfactorily explain his posscss£on of the recently stolen automobile.
Also it is contended that the record as a whole shows

'
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that the defendant's lawyer performed his duties in pre.
paring and presenting a defense in an exemplary manner.
The defense was such as to completely dispel any con.
tention that the defendant was denied his constitutional
right to adequate counsel.
For the above-stated reasons, the Respondent re·
spectfully requests that the conviction of the defendant
for grand larceny be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

